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Abstract:  F. A. Hayek took two trips to Chile, the first in 1977, the second in 1981. The visits were 
controversial. On the first trip he met with General Augusto Pinochet, who had led a coup that overthrew 
Salvador Allende in 1973. During his 1981 visit, Hayek gave interviews that were published in the 
Chilean newspaper El Mercurio and in which he discussed authoritarian regimes and the problem of 
unlimited democracy. After each trip, he complained that the western press had painted an unfair picture 
of the economic situation under the Pinochet regime. Drawing on archival material, interviews, and past 
research, we provide a full account of this controversial episode in Hayek's life. 
Keywords:  F. A. Hayek, Chile, Chicago Boys, Augusto Pinochet, Salvador Allende, Milton Friedman, 
Centro de Estudios Publicos (CEP), El Mercurio 




Friedrich Hayek and his Visits to Chile 
 
Bruce Caldwell and Leonidas Montes  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Friedrich A. Hayek visited Chile twice, once in November 1977, and again in April 1981, both 
visits taking place while General Augusto Pinochet was President. On the first trip, in addition to 
receiving an honorary degree, giving talks and interviews, attending dinners and the like, Hayek 
had about a twenty minute audience with Pinochet. Over the course of the next year Hayek wrote 
about his visit to Chile, once in a journal called Politische Studien, then in letters published in 
The Times of London, decrying the treatment of Chile by the western press. On the second trip 
he was hosted by a newly formed organization, Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP), for which he 
agreed to serve as the Honorary President. While on the trip he met with the executive committee 
of CEP, saw his friends, gave the usual talks and interviews,1 and also met with two former 
Chilean Presidents. The second trip was prior to a regional meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society 
that took place in the coastal city of Viña del Mar, Chile in November 1981, a meeting that 
Hayek himself did not attend. In January 1982 he had another letter to the Editor published, this 
one in the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), in which he criticized the 
editors for printing a cartoon that likened Pinochet to the Polish Prime Minister Wojciech 
Jaruzelski.  
 
Though the reaction to Hayek’s trips, interviews and letters are insignificant compared to 
the outcry that Milton Friedman’s 1975 visit provoked,2 they continue to be mentioned and 
criticized, both by opponents of his ideas, but also by those who otherwise count themselves as 
among his supporters. We have two goals in adding our voices to the discussion. 
 
The first is simply to clarify the record of what happened. We draw on archival materials, 
















La Tercera and La Segunda) and Chilean magazines (Que Pasa and Ercilla), and on interviews 
with principals who are still alive.3 In addition to providing an account of his visits, we will 
identify some obvious mistakes or misleading statements that may be found in other accounts.4 
In other cases, where we simply disagree with certain claims that have been made, we will 
provide evidence in support of our views. Thus, in our opinion,5 there is no available evidence 
for the assertion, made by Klein (2007, p. 103), Grandin (2006), and Robin (2011, p. 74) that 
Hayek was involved in the decision to hold the 1981 regional meeting of the Mont Pèlerin 
Society in Viña del Mar. And contra Fischer (2009), we see little evidence that Hayek or his 
ideas had an impact on the writing or content of the new Chilean constitution that was enacted in 
1980 and went into effect in 1981. 
 
Second, Hayek’s decision to go to Chile, the public statements he made during and after 
his trips, and perhaps most damningly, his failure to speak out against the human rights abuses 
that occurred under Pinochet’s seventeen year rule, also require explanation.  
 
For those who see Hayek as an intellectual godfather of neoliberalism, and who associate 
that doctrine not simply with the promotion of globalization but with more sinister activities 
(e.g., using state power to force the spreading of market regimes), there is little to explain: they 
naturally assume that Hayek would be a supporter of the Pinochet regime.6 One sees this attitude 
expressed in passing comments in the blogosphere or press – for example, the claim that Hayek 


























view of the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet” (Schuessler 2010).7 Others try to establish links 
between Austrian thought and fascism.8 
 
We find such speculations to be singularly unconvincing when it comes to explaining 
Hayek’s visits to Chile. But we are equally unconvinced by explanations by those putative 
supporters who argue that, by the time that Hayek went to Chile, he was an old man who was 
either losing his intellectual powers or growing cranky with age.9 Certainly Hayek did 
dramatically increase the number of interviews he gave following the award of the Nobel Prize 
in 1974, so there were more opportunities for misstatements. But he also did important work 
through the early 1980s (e.g., he completed Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973-79) and wrote 
The Denationalization of Money [1978] (1999)), so the charge that this was all due to mental 





































Instead, we will offer an alternative to the arguments that Hayek was either a closet 
admirer of the Pinochet regime or was losing his mental faculties at the time of his visit.  
Regarding his public statements, we will show that many of the themes to be found during both 
trips drew on ideas that Hayek had developed over the course of his career. Regarding his 
decisions to visit Chile and to remain silent about the human rights abuses that occurred under 
Pinochet, though it is always difficult to establish a person’s motives, we think that these 
decisions had multiple causes. In the course of the paper we will show that Hayek’s first trip was 
set into motion by Manuel Ayau, a longtime Mont Pèlerin member and friend who had recently 
hosted Hayek in Guatemala; that Hayek was suspicious about the objectivity of news reports in 
the western press and was probably curious about what conditions in Chile were really like; that 
he was surprised about the level of economic development that he encountered on both of his 
visits (which deepened his suspicions about the press); that he was reacting not just to Chile but 
to the multiple pressures and concerns brought on by both the cold war and to what he perceived 
as the mistaken direction of the economics profession in the 1970s; and that he was hoping that 
there might be a transition back to a limited democracy, not just in Chile, but in other countries 
which combined an authoritarian and military political regime with a liberal economic system.   
 
The next section will give a necessary background account of the political and economic 
situation in Chile prior to his visits. Section 3 will offer a reconstruction of Hayek’s mindset 
prior to his first trip to Chile. After setting the context, section 4 will discuss the details of the 
November 1977 visit, the trip on which he met with Pinochet. In section 5, we deal with his 
initial forays in the western press, and in section 6 with claims about Hayek organizing the Viña 
del Mar meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society and his influence on the Chilean constitution. 
Hayek’s April 1981 visit to Chile as Honorary President of Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) 
will be covered in section 7, and section 8 will analyze the two controversial and important 
interviews Hayek gave to El Mercurio in 1981. Section 9 will recapitulate the multiple reasons 
behind Hayek’s visits, and section 10 will conclude.  
 
 
2. The Chilean Background 
 
Though the stability of Chile’s democratic republican political system was well-known and long-
standing (and, as such, regarded as rather exceptional within Latin America), all this changed in 
the early 1970s with the election of Marxist President Salvador Allende and his Unidad Popular 
government. Though the new regime had some early economic successes, its policies ultimately 
resulted in a collapsed economy and severe political polarization. The so-called “Chilean Road to 
Socialism” ended on September 11, 1973 with a military coup and Allende’s suicide while under 
bombardment in the Presidential Palace, La Moneda. The National Congress was dissolved and 
Augusto Pinochet and the Junta Militar ran the country for almost seventeen years. The military 
regime enacted strict political repression and committed ruthless human rights abuses. In 1980 a 
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new constitution was approved, one that called for a referendum to take place in 1988. In this 
plebiscite Chileans would decide whether Pinochet would continue for eight more years (”Yes”), 
or democratic elections would be held in 1989 (“No”).10 The “No” option won approximately 
55% of the votes.11 Accordingly, in 1989 the country held both Presidential and congressional 
elections. Patricio Aylwin, a Christian Democrat, was elected with 56% of the votes. Aylwin 
took office on March 11, 1990, and a gradual transition back to democracy began. 
 
2.1. Allende and the Unidad Popular government  
 
Chile had experienced high inflation and only moderate growth during the 1950s and 1960s.  
Development theories promoted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA), established in 1948 and based in Santiago, were quite influential in Latin 
America during this period. Although such theories actually have a rich previous history in 
economics,12 the Singer-Prebisch dependency and import substitution models provided the 
leading development paradigm for most countries in Latin America. The theoretical program 
viewed protectionism and planning as the two most important imperatives for rapid 
development. It was in reaction to the success of this intellectual program and its theoretical 
framework, plus the strong influence of Marxist ideas within certain academic circles,13 that the 
“Chile Project,” the cradle of the “Chicago Boys,” was begun. The project that would so greatly 
influence Chile’s subsequent history had its origins in Albion Patterson’s Plan Chillán in 1953.14 
In 1956 the “Chile Project” was formalized with the signing of a contract between Pontificia 
Universidad Católica de Chile and the Department of Economics of the University of Chicago 


























laboratory of the cold war, the intellectual forces behind it had developed well before the 
political struggle took place. 
 
The two administrations that preceded Allende followed similar economic trajectories.  
With the support of conservative and center right parties, Jorge Alessandri (1896-1986) was 
elected President in 1958 with 32% of the vote. He attempted a managerial approach to 
governance, but this was difficult when dealing with only a minority control of Congress. 
Though there were some initial successes, by 1964, when the next election was held, GDP 
growth was a modest 2.2%, the inflation rate was 44% and the unemployment rate was 6.5%.16 
This paved the way for the election of Eduardo Frei Montalva (1911-1982), whose “Revolution 
in Liberty” campaign attracted the support of members of his own party, the Christian 
Democrats, and a broad spectrum of center right voters who feared the left and Allende. After the 
so-called “naranjazo”,17 liberal and conservative parties reluctantly ended up supporting Frei 
Montalva, who received 55.7% of the votes cast, an absolute majority (Collier and Sater 1996, 
pp. 261-2).18 During Frei Montalva’s time in office (1964-1970), average GDP growth was 4%, 
annual inflation was 34% and the unemployment rate was lowered to 5.9%.19 Except for 
inflation, they were good figures overall, but his administration was perceived as having been 
successful in the beginning, with a sharp slowdown at the end.20  
 
During Frei Montalva’s six years in office his government continued and widened a land 
reform process that had been initiated by Alessandri, and Chilean involvement with American 
copper mines (the so-called “Chilenization of copper”) began. Controlling shares (51%) of the 
























By the 1970s elections the political scene had grown turbulent. In 1967 there was an 
emotional debate over the chiribonos scheme, a plan to postpone the annual public sector salary 
increase that engendered strong popular and political resistance from the public sector union 
(Collier and Sater 1996, p. 319). The episode brought with it increasing inflation, an economic 
slowdown, and considerable political polarization.21  
 
In the September 4, 1970 Presidential election, Radomiro Tomic, the Christian Democrat 
candidate, would receive only 27.8% of the votes, former President Jorge Alessandri came 
second with 34.5%, and Salvador Allende, leader of a left and center left coalition who was 
running for office for the fourth time, won the election with 36.2% of the votes (for an analysis 
of the election see Valenzuela 1978, pp. 39-49). The relative majority required that the election 
be ratified by Congress. A very tense month followed. US President Richard Nixon asked his 
CIA Director Richard Helms to promote a preventive coup through the so-called track II.22 On 
October 22, 1970, a group tried to initiate it by kidnapping General René Schneider, the 
commander in chief of the Chilean Army, who was mortally wounded in the unsuccessful 
attempt (Fermandois 2013, pp. 350-3). Public opinion rallied around Allende and, following the 
Chilean tradition, on October 24 Allende was ratified by Congress as Chile’s first Marxist 
President (and the first Marxist President democratically elected in the western world). The day 
after ratification, Schneider died.  In the middle of the cold war, the so-called “Chilean Road to 
Socialism” became a political experiment closely followed by the world.23 
 
Within a month’s time, Allende’s Unidad Popular government embarked upon a number 
of politically ambitious and controversial socialist structural reforms. The most controversial 
























1971 the copper industry was fully nationalized with the unanimous support of Congress, and 
(unlike the situation under Frei Montalva) without any compensation for American shareholders. 
The agrarian reform that had been timidly initiated under Alessandri and had grown during the 
Frei Montalva administration, was drastically accelerated. Though the process itself was rather 
disorganized, virtually all large estates were expropriated, generating a “chaotic situation in the 
countryside,” political polarization and, of course, declining productivity (Loveman 1976, p. 
301).25 The banking system was also substantially nationalized; by the end of Allende’s 
government, about 85% of the financial sector belonged to the state (Larrain and Meller 1991, p. 
188). The prices of more than 3,000 goods were fixed. In short, the state rapidly gained 
overwhelming control of the economy.  
 
Initially the socialist plan was a resounding success. The Chilean economy experienced 
unprecedented growth of 8.9% in 1971, inflation fell to 28.2% and unemployment fell to a 
historical low of 3.8% with an average increase of real wages of 22.3%. Allende’s government 
had fulfilled, and indeed surpassed, all expectations.26 People from around the world came to 
Chile to witness the successful democratic implementation of socialism, among them Fidel 
Castro, who arrived there on November 10, 1971. His visit was not supposed to be a long one, 
but he stayed for almost a month, traveling around the country and giving lengthy speeches. In 
the end his rhetoric became rather extreme, apparently making Allende uneasy (Fermandois 
2013, pp. 519-28). But the “Chilean Road to Socialism” indeed appeared to be feasible. In this 
celebratory atmosphere, Allende and his Unidad Popular government obtained almost 50% of the 
votes in the Municipal elections of April, 1971.  
 
The outstanding initial successes were not sustainable. The price of copper was relatively 























responsible fiscal management, had given Allende’s government significant foreign reserves to 
utilize for their programs. But its policies of nationalization and expropriation isolated Chile 
from much of the world economy, with the exceptions of Cuba, the Soviet Union, and China. 
When coupled with expansionist policies and the growth of the public sector payroll, the end 
result was significant increases in the fiscal and trade deficits, a decline in international reserves, 
and a large drop in foreign investment. To maintain its programs, the government printed money: 
as early as 1971, M1 increased by 119% (Larrain and Meller, 1991, p. 197). Not surprisingly, by 
1972 the economic situation began to change sharply, and approached a crisis stage by 1973. 
With increasing public sector wages, subsidies to state-owned companies and lower tax 
collections, the public deficit reached 24.5% of GDP in 1972 and 30.5% in 1973 (ibid., p. 200). 
Inflation increased to 255.1% in 1972, and reached 606% in 1973. In August 1973, the month 
before the military coup, inflation was running at an annualized rate close to 1,000%.  In this 
atmosphere, the fixed official prices triggered shortages that gave rise to an active black market. 
The government was forced to organize the distribution of certain basic necessities.  
 
On March 5, 1973, Frei Montalva in an alarming interview in The Times complained 
about Allende’s government, who by “trespassing on the law or using it arbitrarily and contrary 
to its spirit, they have tried to impose this totalitarian étatiste model” and declaring that “Chile is 
following step by step the path of Cuba.”27 In June 1973, the Chilean Supreme Court openly 
criticized Allende, stating that the country was facing “a crisis of the rule of law” (see 
Valenzuela 1978, p. 91 and note 29). But for many socialist leaders, it was simply a matter of 
“the primacy of politics”: as Pedro Vuskovic, Allende’s minister of Economy from 1970 through 
1972, had earlier said, “Economic policy is subordinate, in its content, shape and form, to the 
political needs of increasing Popular Unity support…: a central objective is to widen support for 
the government” (quoted in Collier and Sater 1996, p. 346).  
 
As 1973 progressed there was a massive transport strike and several incidents of violence 
and other signs of civil unrest. Chile had become a highly polarized society, with one side 
blaming “the enemies of the people” (a category that included such targets as oligarchs, 
imperialists and fascists) who were accused of creating shortages for their own profit, while the 
other side blamed Allende and his Unidad Popular government for the economic failures of their 
policies. As the economy spiraled downwards, the social and political atmosphere became 











Families were divided: old friendships were strained to the breaking point: tempers were 
comprehensibly lost. It was a time when many of the traditional Chilean virtues, above all 
the virtue of convivencia, the ability to respect alternative points of view, seemed totally 
in abeyance (Collier and Sater 1996, p. 355). 
 
 On August 22, 1973 the lower chamber of the Chilean Congress adopted a resolution 
accusing Allende’s government of breaking the laws and violating the constitution.28 Given the 
tone and content of this declaration, it could be interpreted as a call for a military coup.29 In early 
September, after negotiations between Allende and the Christian Democrats had failed, some 
members of the government coalition were calling for armed revolution. Allende had lost 
political control of the situation and of his own coalition. Finally, on September 11, 1973, the 
three branches of Chile's armed forces and Carabineros (Chile’s national police) joined to 



















abrupt and bloody end with the symbolic bombardment of the Presidential Palace.30 After a 
tragic and emotional radio address, Allende committed suicide in his office at La Moneda.31 
 
2.2. Pinochet’s military regime 
 
The Junta Militar imposed harsh political repression. Congress was closed on September 21, 
1973, and the systematic persecution of communists, socialists, and indeed anyone linked to the 
left, was initiated. The first three months after the coup were particularly violent, but human 
rights abuses extended throughout the entire period in which the military regime was in power 
(official figures put the final death toll at 3,197).32 The murders and torture are both a stigma and 
a wound for Chilean republican history that still mark and pain its citizens.  
 
The international press reported on the human rights abuses both during and after the 
coup. The Commission on Human Rights at the United Nations established an ad hoc Working 
Group that visited Chile. They submitted two condemnatory reports in 1975 and 1976. 
Moreover, in September 1976, Orlando Letelier, Allende’s former Ambassador to the US, was 



































This brutal assassination attracted worldwide attention and censure, especially after the 
involvement of DINA, Pinochet’s secret police, was revealed two years later. Pinochet 
responded to the United Nations human rights panel by calling for a referendum of support for 
the military regime in January 1978, which he received in a mock election that took place just 
two months after Hayek’s first visit Chile.  
 
In political and economic terms, although officials from the Armed Forces took key 
positions in government in the first period of the military regime, the influence of the Chicago 
Boys was already present.34 From the outset, the two main economic objectives of the Junta were 
to get inflation under control and to reestablish a market economy. A massive devaluation, the 
removal of price controls on nearly 3,000 goods, and the return of many firms confiscated by the 
Unidad Popular, followed.  The immediate effect of the removal of price controls was to put 
upward pressure on prices. Inflation was 606.1% in 1973 and 369.2% in 1974. In July1974 Jorge 
Cauas, a well-respected Christian Democrat economist who had been President of the Chilean 
Central Bank under Frei Montalva, was appointed as Finance “Super” Minister with the charge 
of bringing inflation under control.  His problems were compounded by an adverse international 
economic climate: the price of copper had fallen sharply, oil prices were soaring, and 
international creditors were wary of Chile. Facing both high unemployment and high inflation,  
Cauas implemented a “National Recovery Plan,” what would become known as a “shock 
treatment” approach to stabilization.35 
 
Inflation was indeed brought under control, but the required economic restraint (as well 
as the firing of legions of state employees as state firms were returned to their owners or 
privatized) caused unemployment to remain high (18% in 1975, 21.9% in 1976 and 18.1% in 
1977). At the end of 1976, Jorge Cauas resigned and Sergio de Castro, the most prominent and 
emblematic Chicago Boy, assumed the position of Finance Minister. After that, the influence and 
control of the Chicago Boys was evident in all relevant government positions. Immediately after 
de Castro assumed office, Chile withdrew from the Andean Pact – a trade agreement with 
Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador – and drastically reduced its high tariffs on 
foreign goods to a uniform 10%.36 The increased competition that resulted had a huge positive 



















As noted, privatizations also began during this first period of economic liberalization. 
Under Allende, Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO), a state corporation to 
promote productive activities, became a kind of Chilean state holding company. It expanded 
from owning 46 firms and no banks in 1970, to controlling 488 firms and 19 banks in 1973. Over 
the next five years the Chicago Boys implemented an extensive privatization scheme, such that 
by 1978 all but one bank had been privatized and CORFO controlled only 23 firms, of which 11 
were in the process of being sold to the private sector (Edwards and Cox, 1991, pp. 95-98).37 The 
opening up of the economy and the implementation of additional market-oriented reforms38 
ultimately led to signs of economic recovery.  
 
Hayek’s visits in 1977 and 1981 took place while the Chilean economy was on the 
rebound: between 1975 and 1981 the average annual growth rate was 7.3%. In addition, in 
September 1980 a new Constitution had been enacted, one that included an article that called for 
a plebiscite in 1988. So a slow and gradual political transition back towards a constitutional 
democracy appeared to have begun. In this atmosphere, Pinochet, in January 1981, trumpeted 
“the seven modernizations.”39 Hayek’s second visit, in April 1981, took place during a booming 
and optimistic economic time.   
 
The strong recovery of the early 1980s came to an abrupt end with the world recession of 
1982, which hit the US and Latin America particularly hard. The Chilean situation was further 
aggravated because the peso had been pegged to the dollar in June 1979. Triggered by 
skyrocketing international interest rates, the recession resulted in a significant fall in the 
exchange rate, lower prices for Chilean exports (especially copper, which reached its lowest 
price in 50 years), a rapid accumulation of private foreign debt, and a virtual halt to capital 
inflows from abroad. Moreover, the recently freed banking system lacked sufficient regulation. 
A group of industrial conglomerates loosely related to the banks known as the grupos became 




















unemployment reached almost 25% and the real rate of growth of GDP plummeted -14.1%. In 
Chile the 1982-3 recession was comparable in its effect only to the Great Depression. 
 
During this period it seemed that monetarism and the economic liberalization policies of 
the Chicago Boys had failed.41 Sergio de Castro left as Minister of Hacienda in April 1982. A 
period of acute economic depression, political uncertainty, and intense social and civil unrest, 
followed.42 The controversial fixed exchange rate was abandoned in June 1982. In 1985 the 
country would take off again under the market oriented and pragmatic macroeconomic 
management undertaken by the Finance Minister, Hernán Buchi.43 By 1988 economic growth 
was at 7.3% and unemployment 9.9%. In that year, the Constitution called for a plebiscite. 
Despite political intrigue and official abuses during the campaign,44 a majority of Chileans voted 
“No,” so that presidential and parliamentary elections followed in 1989 as part of the 
constitutional mandate. Patricio Aylwin was elected with 56% of the votes. During 1989, the last 
complete year of Pinochet as President, real GDP growth reached 10.5% and unemployment hit a 
low of 7.9%. On March 11, 1990, in a ceremony at the new Congressional building in 



































experienced economic growth and political stability. During the golden period of 1985-97 GDP 
grew at an average annual rate of 7.1% and GDP per capita doubled (De Gregorio 2005, p. 23). 
Nowadays Chile has the highest GDP per capita in Latin America, though critics point out that 
this is accompanied by considerable income inequality. 
 
3. Hayek’s Mindset in the 1970s 
 
In 1969 Hayek and his wife moved from the University of Freiburg in West Germany to the 
University of Salzburg in Austria. It was an inauspicious move. For a variety of reasons he was 
unhappy, perhaps even depressed in Salzburg, and in any event he did not get much work done.46 
But in early 1974 the depression lifted and he returned to full working capacity. In that same year 
he was jointly awarded the Nobel Prize with the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal.47 Over the 
course of the next few years he would complete his trilogy Law, Legislation and Liberty (Hayek 
1973, 1976, 1979) and open a new avenue of inquiry with the publication of his pamphlet The 
Denationalization of Money (Hayek [1978] 1999).   
 
 The Nobel Prize made Hayek, for the second time in his life, into a public intellectual. He 
had had the experience before when the publication of the Reader’s Digest edition of The Road 
to Serfdom and a barnstorming public relations U. S. book tour in 1945 had made his name (if 
not his ideas) recognizable for a time to millions of readers.48 By 1974 those heady days were 
rather far behind him. Now, suddenly, it began anew. He sat for newspaper, news magazine, and 
radio and television interviews. He was invited to visit university campuses to give speeches, 
even commencement addresses. Whenever he visited a foreign country, he would be interviewed 
by their press and sometimes be invited to meet with government officials. Hayek’s views were 
seldom widely popular, and perhaps even less so in the 1970s, but they had the advantage of a 
certain novelty. Thus articles explaining, extolling, and (perhaps more frequently) criticizing his 
ideas appeared with fair regularity. Hayek also increased his own activity, writing letters to the 
Editor of newspapers like The Times of London and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ).49 
 
At the end of March 1975, only a few months after Hayek had gone to Sweden to accept 















Harberger on a trip to Chile to take part in a series of talks and seminars on economics.50 For six 
days they would both participate in various seminars and public talks (Friedman and Friedman, 
1998, pp. 398-99). As noted earlier, by 1975 inflation in Chile had fallen from its peak in 1973, 
but was still a major problem. During his visit Friedman had a forty-five minute meeting with 
Pinochet in which he recommended a dramatic decrease in the rate of the increase of the money 
supply to get inflation under control. Friedman later sent Pinochet a letter in which he outlined 
this and other policies (ibid., p. 399). 
 
Friedman’s trip was criticized by the New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis in 
September of that year. Soon thereafter, student protests began at the University of Chicago. 
Though the protests included such things as picketing the apartment house where he and Rose 
lived, they were small and, according to the Friedmans, “… they were not very serious. 
However, they were the first of many during the next five years or so” (ibid., p. 402). 
 
Things got much worse the next month when it was announced that Friedman would 
receive the 1976 Nobel Prize in Economics. Within weeks of the announcement, the New York 
Times published a letter from two Nobel laureates, George Wald (medicine) and Linus Pauling 
(chemistry and peace), criticizing the award committee for a “deplorable exhibition of 
insensitivity” in giving him the prize. On the same day they published another letter, this one 
signed by laureates David Baltimore and S. E. Luria (both in medicine), calling the award 
committee’s decision “disturbing” and “an insult to the people of Chile” who were “burdened by 
the reactionary economic measures sponsored by Professor Friedman” (ibid., pp. 596-97). When 
Friedman went to Sweden to receive the prize in December there were multiple demonstrations, 
some rather large. During the ceremony itself an individual protester shouted “Down with 
capitalism, freedom for Chile” as Friedman was receiving the award. Vocal protests at his 
speaking appearances would recur over the next few years. Regarding the whole episode, 
Friedman concluded, “I never could decide whether to be more amused or more annoyed by the 
charge that I was running the Chilean economy from my office desk in Chicago” (ibid, p. 400).51 
 
The turmoil over the Friedman prize ended up touching Hayek. On December 14, 1976, 















newspaper Dagens Nyheter, an English translation of which soon appeared in the American 
popular economics magazine Challenge. Noting Friedman’s recent receipt of the prize, Myrdal 
criticized the Swedish Academy of Science for its secretive practices in choosing the recipient, a 
process that makes it difficult for any opposition to form prior to their recommendation. He also 
argued that, because economics is at best a “soft” science, the awarding of the prize had become 
a political act that should be discontinued. Myrdal then segued into a discussion of the prize he 
had shared with Hayek (another political act, in his view), noting the “thousands of cablegrams I 
received from colleagues all over the world, mostly informing me that they were deeply critical 
of the Nobel Prize being given to von Hayek” (Myrdal 1977, p. 52).  He ended his piece 
expressing regret that he had accepted the award. His excuse was that “I should have declined to 
receive it, particularly as I did not need the money but gave it away… But I had not then thought 
the problem through. I was merely disgusted. Also, the message reached me very early one 
morning in New York, when I was totally off my guard” (ibid.).52 
 
Hayek knew of the Myrdal piece soon after it was published in Swedish because Ole-
Jacob Hoff sent a letter summarizing its contents to Friedman, and copied Hayek on it.53 Hayek 
had throughout his career been known for keeping his disagreements with opponents on a 
professional level.54 By the 1970s he was doubtless beginning to wonder if this had been a good 
strategy. The treatment Friedman was receiving would have angered him. So would Myrdal’s 
intemperate public remarks.  
 
We also know from his notecards that Hayek was increasingly agitated about the 
direction the economics profession was taking at the time. Indeed, he was thinking of writing a 
























considerable amount of time in the late 1970s on “the Paris Challenge,” a debate he hoped to 
organize on capitalism versus socialism. This too never materialized, but it ultimately led him to 
another writing project, one that culminated in The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism 
(1988), his final major publication.   
 
All of this is simply meant to convey Hayek’s frame of mind when he received the 
invitation to visit Chile in June, 1977. The invitation was sent to Freiburg but forwarded to the 
Hoover Institution at Stanford, where Hayek was spending much of the month. By then Milton 
Friedman, who had retired from Chicago the year before, was a fellow of the Hoover Institution 
at Stanford and he was living with Rose in San Francisco. They doubtless would have seen each 
other, and probably even discussed Friedman’s visit to Chile in 1975, its effects, the 
consequences of accepting the offer to visit Chile, and perhaps even some details of the Chilean 
economic situation.  
 
Hayek later reported that when it became public knowledge that he had accepted the 
invitation, he received many letters and phone calls, many from “well-intentioned people I did 
not know… [all of] which were intended to stop me from visiting such an objectionable country” 
(Hayek, quoted in Farrant, McPhail and Berger 2012, p. 518).56 Of course, it was revulsion over 
human rights abuses that caused so many people to advise him not to visit Chile. But there were 
other countervailing elements in play. It was, after all, the middle of the cold war, and Chile was 
being censured by for having overthrown a democratically-elected Marxist government. Hayek 
was a life-long critic of socialism, and he was doubtless curious to see for himself a country that 
had moved from a Marxist government to an authoritarian military regime that was 
implementing free market oriented policies. Given Hayek’s character, his mindset, and the larger 
political context, it is rather hard to imagine him not accepting the invitation to go to Chile.57 
 
 
4. The November 1977 visit 
 
The letter officially inviting Hayek to Chile to give a lecture and receive an honorary degree was 
dated May 12, 1977, and came from Juan Naylor, the Rector of Universidad Técnica Federico 














Fundación Adolfo Ibáñez, will arrange the details of your visit.” This invitation was sent to 
Hayek on May 25, 1977 with an accompanying letter from Pedro Ibáñez, a prominent 
entrepreneur, former Senator, and the President of the Fundación Adolfo Ibáñez (Adolfo Ibáñez 
was Pedro Ibáñez´s father), the organization that ran the Valparaíso Business School (Escuela de 
Negocios de Valparaíso). Ibáñez took care to mention that though the Valparaíso Business 
School was “officially associated” with the Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María, it was 
independent “both academically and economically.”59 He then asserts that,  
 
…we believe that a visit of one week may allow a fair knowledge of our country and its 
problems, and could provide various opportunities to foster both the political and 
economic concepts so outstandingly set forth by you… You may be sure that our 
academic world as well as our country public opinion, will listen with deep interest to 
your illuminating views. 
 
In his letter Ibáñez reminded him that Manuel Ayau had previously alerted Hayek that the 
invitation would be coming.60 Ayau was a key advocate of classical liberalism in Latin America, 
the founder of Universidad Francisco Marroquín in Guatemala, and would be the President of 
the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1979-1980. On March 30, 1977 Ayau had written to Hayek that he 
had recently been visited by “former Senator Pedro Ibáñez, member of our Mont Pèlerin Society 
and founding and present President of Adolfo Ibáñez Foundation.” He added that the foundation, 
established some twenty five years ago, ran “a school of economics and business along the same 
philosophical lines of our university [that is, the Universidad Francisco Marroquín], philosophy 
that Senator Ibáñez has expounded through his political career in Chile.” He then told Hayek that 
the Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María had received a grant from the “Earhart 
Foundation (Ann Arbor)” to invite a distinguished economist, so “it is their wish to submit their 
formal invitation to you to come to Chile to receive an honorary degree of the Universidad Santa 
Maria and deliver a few lectures in his country sometime this year, or whenever it is convenient 
for you.” Pedro Ibáñez had asked Ayau “to consult” Hayek to see if he “could consider such an 

















proceed to send you their formal invitation. They would feel highly honored by your 
acceptance.”61 
 
Ayau’s letter of support had its intended effect. On April 6, 1977 Hayek replied to Ayau 
saying “I have long wished to see the West Coast of South America which I do not know and 
should be pleased to receive an invitation from the Universidad Santa Maria.”62 On June 10, 
1977 Hayek replied in a handwritten letter to Pedro Ibáñez accepting the invitation and saying 
that as soon as he has “access to a typewriter, which will be next week at the Hoover Institution, 
Stanford” he will officially confirm adding that he “wanted to send you this first reply at once.”63 
Finally, on June 13, 1977, Hayek formally replied from the Hoover Institution accepting the 
invitation.64  
 
A few months later Hayek would hear from another important player for his 1977 visit, 
Carlos Cáceres, Dean of the Valparaíso Business School and, later, Chilean Central Bank 
President and Pinochet’s Finance and Interior Minister. They had a brief exchange of letters 
nailing down details of the trip in September and early October.65 In late October, Cáceres sent 
Hayek a preliminary itinerary for the Chilean leg of his trip.66 
 
The itinerary had him arriving in Santiago on Monday 14, then traveling directly to Viña 
del Mar on the coast. On Tuesday, November 15, he would receive the Doctor Honoris Causa 
degree and then give an academic lecture. A press conference was organized for the afternoon. 
On Wednesday he would meet faculty members of the Valparaíso Business School, then travel to 

























was to occur, followed by lunch at El Mercurio, to be hosted by Sub-director Arturo Fontaine, 
another press conference, and a lecture to students of the Valparaíso Business School. On Friday 
he would meet faculty members of several Departments of Economics and give a lecture to 
businessmen in the evening. On Saturday morning he would travel to Colunquén, a private farm 
owned by Pedro Ibáñez, located in the Aconcagua valley, some 80 miles from Santiago. Finally, 
on Sunday, November 20, he would fly to Buenos Aires, Argentina.  
 
Additional events, and one clarification, may be found on what is presumably the official 
final itinerary. These include a “Visit to the President of the Republic” on Thursday, November 
17 at noon (the 12:00 is handwritten in over an earlier time that day). An interview with Que 
Pasa magazine upon arrival, and another with Ercilla magazine on Thursday at 16:30, replacing 
the press conference that had originally been scheduled, were also added. Finally, a Friday 
evening reception for the conservative German politician Franz Josef Strauss was written in by 
hand.  
 
The question arises: did Hayek know in advance that he would meet Pinochet? It was not 
in his initial itinerary, though certainly the statement that was there, that the trip would include a 
“visit to the highest government authorities,” might have led him to suspect it. Interestingly, 
eight days before the event El Mercurio had already announced that a meeting was planned.67 
 
Carlos Cáceres and Pedro Ibáñez were the only persons with Hayek when he met with 
Pinochet, and Cáceres is the only person still alive who was present at the meeting. There were 
no translators: Ibáñez, as Hayek’s host in Chile, played that role. In 2010 Cáceres agreed to sit 
for an interview with both authors, and he was able to remember many details of Hayek’s trip. 
Cáceres recalled picking Hayek up at the airport in Santiago and taking him to Viña del Mar, 
which is where the Valparaíso Business School and Universidad Técnica Federico Santa María 
are located. On the way there they stopped in Casablanca, at a restaurant famous for its chicken 
stew. When they arrived at Viña del Mar, Hayek found the coastal resort setting much to his 
taste, walking on the beach and bending down to inspect the stones. Hayek would return there 
accompanied by his wife in 1981.68 
 
When it came to the details of Hayek’s meeting with Pinochet, however, Cáceres had 
much less to say. His memory was that it was a brief twenty minute affair, and whatever was 











substantive, noting the difficulty of intercourse when neither party knew the others’ language. It 
should probably be mentioned that Pinochet would barely have known whom Hayek was, except 
that he was a Nobel laureate in economics who was apparently supportive of the Chilean 
economic recovery plan. 
 
More information about the encounter is provided in newspaper accounts, for directly 
before and after the meeting Hayek spoke to members of the press. El Mercurio ran an article the 
next day, noting that Hayek had said that “he had talked to Pinochet about the issue of limited 
democracy and representative government on which he wrote a book. He said that in his work he 
argues that unlimited democracy cannot work because, in his opinion, it creates different forces 
that end up destroying democracy.” He told reporters that Pinochet “listened carefully and asked 
him for the documents that he had written on the issue.” This is consistent with Hayek’s 
secretary Charlotte Cubitt’s recollection that on his return Hayek asked her to send Pinochet a 
copy of his chapter on “The Model Constitution” from Law, Legislation and Liberty.69 Given the 
prominence of the idea of “limited democracy” in Hayek’s writings of the time, that both 
Cáceres and Ibáñez were members of the Council of State, and that in a few years (1980) a new 
constitution would be adopted, it is certainly plausible that Hayek would have mentioned his 
own writings on constitutions and democracy.  
 
In the El Mercurio article Hayek also expressed his surprise at the state of development 
he had found: before coming to Chile he thought he was going to find an underdeveloped 
country, “but now he could not use that term to define Chile.” He praised the government for its 
willingness to run the country “without being obsessed with popular commitments or political 
expectations of any kind,” adding that the painful economic reforms they were experiencing 
were a “necessary evil that will soon be overcome.” He ended by praising market liberalization 










the country is undertaking is an example for the world.”70 According to Carlos Cáceres, who 
wrote to Hayek soon after the visit, his positive comments were well-received by the regime.71 
 
Hayek’s praise for the regime’s economic policies contrasts with more cautious 
statements he made earlier in his trip. Hayek’s visit was covered in the newspapers, often as front 
page news, and one can trace his reaction by following the stories day by day. On the first couple 
of days the reports consist only of summaries of his lectures, and there was nothing in them 
about Chile. There was, however, a statement about democracy: “Although I am an eminently 
democratic person, I think that the democratic system cannot be unlimited, as it needs protections 
to avoid the influence of power and interest groups.”72 When he talked to the press on 
Wednesday (his comments would appear in El Mercurio the next day), he told journalists that he 
had seen little of Chile but thought that from what he had seen the economic situation “is much 
better than I had expected.” Regarding the current economic plan, he said that “it has been 
applied for only three years, and this is a period too short to make a judgment.” Asked about the 
new direction in which the leaders had taken the Chilean economy, one different from that of the 
last 30 years, Hayek said that he thought that it was the right direction, and emphasized the 
importance of free enterprise for development, especially in a small country like Chile that "has 
to explore and find opportunities to obtain more welfare. And this is possible only with free 
enterprise." He then criticized planning and warned of the dangers of powerful unions. When one 
journalist asked Hayek about the rise in unemployment that the new economic regime had 
created, Hayek argued that “the country should not look for short term remedies, but for the long 
term conditions that will finally end up creating new jobs.” He added that it was easy for 
politicians simply to print money, but that that was no solution. When the journalist persisted in 
questioning the social costs of the reforms, Hayek ended up saying that “he does not know 
anything about Chile, but what you say is very familiar to me and I have heard it in other 
countries. If politicians are not prepared to take drastic measures, we always hear those same 





















is attacked in the typical way that all governments that take the necessary measures are 
attacked.”73 
 
Hayek’s interview with Que Pasa magazine has a number of interesting dimensions.74 
First, Hayek warned about the dangers of inflation, then (echoing the opening sentences of his 
1974 Nobel address) stated that economists have nothing to feel proud about, that the profession 
had created a huge amount of confusion. When he is asked his opinion of Milton Friedman’s 
views, he pointed out a number of differences from those of his own, a contrast that would not 
have gone unnoticed by the Chicago Boys. Next, and presumably in reference to the policies 
under Allende, he criticized excessive government expenditure because as it improves 
employment in the short term, it increases the threat of inflation. In Hayek’s opinion, politicians 
who use it are guilty of “Après nous, le deluge” thinking. Finally, he makes an argument that he 
had made for decades: that democracy is a means, not an end. The end should be individual 
freedom. As a means for the majority of citizens peacefully to rid a government they do not like, 
it is very valuable. But an unlimited democracy is one of the worst forms of government.75 
 
Hayek’s lack of knowledge of the details of the workings of the Chilean economy was 
revealed in his interview in Ercilla magazine. Referring to the three main prices in the economy 
– interest rates, salaries and the exchange rate – the interviewer asked Hayek whether one could 
talk of a market economy in Chile if only interest rates are free. Hayek replied, “Really? I 
thought the exchange rate was free. Well, I believe that that is not too damaging. The real 
problem is fixed salaries. The economy cannot work unless relative salaries are in equilibrium… 
Inflexible salaries are a major obstacle for the market to function well.” Asked his opinion about 
the economic recovery, he offered his strongest words of approval: “It is extraordinary! I am 
very surprised. I would have never expected this degree of prosperity after hearing how the 
economy was three years ago. I am amazed.”76 
 
To summarize, Hayek’s long-time acquaintance from the Mont Pèlerin Society, Manuel 
Ayau, was instrumental in paving the way for Hayek’s invitation to Chile. The itinerary for the 
trip shows that, with the exception of his meeting with Pinochet and other officials on Thursday, 















knew beforehand that he would meet Pinochet, though it was known by the Chilean press a full 
week before his arrival. It seems to us reasonable to conclude that the principal goal from the 
perspective of those who invited him was to have his stature lend some legitimacy to the 
economic reforms and to the Pinochet regime. Hayek seems not to have known much about the 
Chilean economy prior to his visit. As the week progressed, Hayek reached the conclusion that 
economic conditions in Chile were much better than he had anticipated, and concluded further 
that those conditions had been misrepresented in the international press. Hayek soon would make 
evident his displeasure with press coverage.  
 
5. Hayek’s Forays in the Press 
 
On Sunday November 20, 1977, Hayek flew to Buenos Aires.77 A week later, when 
Hayek was in Sao Paulo, Brazil, he sent a letter to Jurgen Eick, the editor of the liberal German 
newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), offering a short article on Chile entitled 
“Internationaler Rufmord: Eine Personliche Stellungnahme” (“International Character 
Assassination: A Personal Statement”).78 The editor sent a reply declining the offer, saying that 
though they might agree in substance with the points Hayek made, that the style of the article 
would be unfit to convince skeptics and would lead his critics to label him a “Chile-Strauss.” The 
term refers to the firestorm that had erupted in Germany in reaction to comments that the 
German politician Franz Josef Strauss had made during and after his own five day visit to Chile. 
Strauss had reported that he was impressed by the “domestic peace and political stability” he had 
encountered in Chile. He said that the Pinochet government “while authoritarian, was not 
totalitarian and much less brutal than other military regimes throughout the world,” but added 
that he had told “Pinochet and other members of the junta that he was committed to 
parliamentary democracy and thought Chile’s leaders should gradually lead their nation back to 
such a system” (Hofmann 1977, p. 4). In response, a group of German clergymen and university 
professors called on the German government to take legal action against Strauss for “aiding and 
abetting a terrorist organization,” namely, the Chilean junta (ibid.). Though he had met Strauss in 
Chile, Hayek was apparently not aware at the time that he submitted his article to the FAZ about 
the controversy that had raged in the German press. 
 
Regarding his own article, Hayek wrote back to say that he was disappointed with their 













presumably exculpate the newspaper from any responsibility beyond giving a reader a chance to 
express his view. He added that if they refused again, he would offer it to Strauss to be published 
in a conservative journal called Politische Studien.79 The FAZ did in fact decline again, and the 
article was ultimately published in 1978 under the shorter title “Internationaler Rufmord” in 
Politische Studien.  
 
 It was in this report that Hayek recounted how well-intentioned people had tried to keep 
him from going to Chile. He went on to say that in Chile he had met “educated, reasonable, and 
insightful men – men who honestly hope that the country can be returned to a democratic order 
soon” (Hayek, translated in Farrant, McPhail and Berger 2012, p. 518). As Farrant et al. point 
out, Hayek’s goal in his brief piece is neither to defend the Pinochet regime nor even to report on 
the political and economic situation in Chile: “Instead, Hayek argues that the Pinochet regime is 
unfairly subjected to a particularly negative propaganda campaign” (ibid., p. 517). In his opinion, 
international reporting on both Chile and South Africa had systematically distorted the truth.80 
Moreover, he argued that the boycotts and other sanctions against those countries had been made 
on an arbitrary basis rather than in accordance with principles that had been set out beforehand 
(ibid., p. 518).  Those who know of Hayek’s recurring emphasis on the importance of following 
general rules that are articulated in advance of a specific concrete situation will find the 
sentiments expressed in “Internationaler Rufmord” quite familiar.   
 
After he received the Nobel Prize Hayek became an increasingly frequent contributor to 
the Letters to the Editor page of The Times of London.81 His letters criticizing certain legal 
immunities enjoyed by British labor unions provoked often heated replies. He also wrote about 
such topics as immigration, inflation, monetarism, and current events. In a July 11, 1978 letter to 
The Times Hayek defended Margaret Thatcher, noting that when she said that, “free choice is to 
be exercised more in the market place than in the ballot box, she has merely uttered the truism 
that the first is indispensable for individual freedom while the second is not: free choice can at 
least exist under a dictatorship that can limit itself but not under the government for an unlimited 
democracy which cannot.”82 This prompted a comment, published on July 24, from a Mr. 















In a letter of August 3, 1978, Hayek replied to the charge, noting that, “I have certainly 
never contended that generally authoritarian governments are more likely to secure individual 
liberty than democratic ones, but rather the contrary. This does not mean, however, that in some 
historical circumstances personal liberty may not have been better protected under an 
authoritarian than democratic government.” To illustrate his claim, Hayek argued that there had 
been more personal liberty in ancient Greece under the ’30 tyrants’ than under the democracy 
that killed Socrates, and more under Salazar’s early government in Portugal than under the 
‘democracies’ of Eastern Europe, Africa, and much of South America.83 He then wrote the 
sentence that would cause even his staunchest allies to wince: “I have not been able to find a 
single person even in much maligned Chile who did not agree that personal freedom was much 
greater under Pinochet than it had been under Allende.”84 One critic pointed out that it would be 
hard to find dissenters if all of them had been killed. Hayek’s longtime nemesis, Lord Kaldor, 
chimed in a few months later that, “if we take Professor Hayek literally, a fascist dictatorship of 
some kind should be regarded as the necessary pre-condition (along with monetarism) of a ‘free 
society’.”85 Kaldor’s letter gives a suggestion of the kind of response that Hayek’s words 
generated.  
 
6. The Chilean Constitution and the Viña del Mar Mont Pèlerin Society Meeting  
 
We take up next two claims that have been made in the secondary literature that we would like to 
challenge. The first has to do with the effect of Hayek’s 1977 visit on the development of the 
Chilean constitution, which was enacted in September 1980 and went into effect in March 1981. 
The second deals with Hayek’s role in choosing the site for the 1981 Mont Pèlerin Society 
Regional meeting, which took place in Viña del Mar. 
 
6.1 Hayek and the Chilean Constitution 
 
In a section of her chapter entitled “‘Authoritarian Freedom’: A Hayekian Constitution 
for Chile,” Karin Fischer claims that Hayek had a substantial influence on the content of the 















The constitution was drafted by gremialista leader Jaime Guzmán,86 who from the 
beginning served as the architect of the legal and constitutional framework of military 
government. The constitution was not only named after Hayek´s book The Constitution of 
Liberty, but also incorporated significant elements of Hayek´s thinking… Guzmán clearly 
drew from Hayek in distinguishing between authoritarianism and totalitarianism in order 
to justify a state’s use of repressive measures when they are required… Not surprisingly, 
Hayek went to some lengths to bestow legitimacy on the new Chilean constitution, since 
he had been personally consulted by the Chilean government in the process leading up to 
the final draft. During his first visit to Chile in 1978 [sic., the visit was in 1977], Pinochet 
invited him to a personal meeting. Hayek’s influence extended beyond the merely 
personal, however. One member of the commission in charge of drafting the constitution, 
Carlos Cáceres, was a close follower of Hayek and eventually joined the MPS in 1980 
(Fischer 2009, pp. 327-28). 
 
There seem to be at least three claims here. The first is that Hayek’s meeting with Pinochet 
constituted a personal governmental consultation prior to the final drafting of the constitution. 
The second is that Jaime Guzmán, who all acknowledge had an important role both in earlier 
discussions, and in the drafting of the constitution, was influenced by Hayek’s ideas.87 The third 
is that Hayek exercised further influence through his relationship with Carlos Cáceres.  
 
 The first claim is the easiest to dismiss. As was shown, Hayek’s 1977 visit was itself 
intense, but short in duration. And his meeting with Pinochet, who personally had little impact on 
the development of the constitution, was a formal and abbreviated one. The second and third 
claims, however, require more attention.   
  
 A good place to begin is to point out that Hayek and his work was virtually unknown in 
Chile in the 1970s. Those who knew of him may have read The Road to Serfdom, but very few 
Chileans had read anything beyond his most popular book. The best illustration of the relative 
ignorance among Chileans of Hayek’s work is that, as late as 1981, Lucia Santa Cruz, a reputed 
historian who interviewed Hayek for El Mercurio, was apparently not aware that Hayek had 
already finished the third volume of his trilogy Law, Legislation and Liberty, a book that had 












CEP, and only began when Hayek became its Honorary President in 1981.88 For perhaps obvious 
reasons, Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom (1962) and later his popular Free to 
Choose: A Personal Statement (1980), were read and were influential.89 If Jaime Guzmán did 
indeed play an important role in the creation of the 1980 Constitution, numerous accounts state 
that though he had intellectual interests, he was first and foremost a politician.90 Although 
Hayek’s books were in his library, relevant testimonies doubt that Guzmán had read them.91  
 
The most important influences on Jaime Guzmán’s worldview were two: Catholic 
Thomism – a profoundly influential intellectual current at Pontificia Universidad Católica de 
Chile that was fundamental for gremialismo – and the ideas of the German jurist Carl Schmitt 
(see Cristi 1998; [2000] 2014, especially chapter 3). In his book Der Hüter der Verfassung 
(1931), which might be translated as “The Protector (or Guardian) of Democracy,” Schmitt had 
developed the idea of “protected democracy,” would become a fundamental concept to 
Guzmán’s approach to legal and constitutional matters.92 Cristi not only identifies Schmitt as a 

































importance of Spanish carlismo, something that may have led to Guzman’s early admiration of 
Franco.93 
 
As an aside, the usual picture of Guzmán as mastermind of constitution also requires 
some explanation and development.  It is true that from the beginning of the military regime, 
Guzmán was the most influential advisor in legal and constitutional matters. The principal 
position statements, including the foundational Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile 
(Declaration of Principles of the Chilean Government, March, 11, 1974) and Chacarilla 
Discourse (July 9, 1977), were written by Guzmán. But even if his influence in the creation of 
the 1980 Constitution was fundamental, he did not act alone. The 1980 Constitution was in 
reality the outcome of a long, slow and complex political process that involved many players.  
 
Two days after the coup, the Junta Militar appointed Guzmán to lead a group to study the 
constitution (Cristi [2000] 2014, p. 45).94 Ten days after the coup, the Junta appointed a 
commission of constitutional lawyers to prepare a draft for a new Constitution. The group was 
initially dubbed “Comisión Constituyente”, then “Comisión de Estudio de la Nueva Constitución 
Política del Estado” and finally simply “Comisión Ortúzar”, and served from 1973 to 1978. In 
September 1976, after the Orlando Letelier killing, the impetus for the group to begin substantive 
work was increased due to external as well as internal pressures. By July 1977, Pinochet began 
talking publicly (especially in the so-called Chacarillas discourse) about a transition and referred 
to a new Constitution. Under the influence of Guzmán, Pinochet also called for an “autocratic 
and protected democracy.” Soon thereafter, in November 1977, Pinochet set out some 
“Orientations” for a new Constitution (“Orientaciones Básicas para el Estudio de una Nueva 
Constitución”), which further accelerated the discussion. Perhaps it was a necessary political 
gesture or a simple manouvre. But it became a commitment.   
 
Pinochet had established a Council of State (“Consejo de Estado”) in January 1976 to 
advise him, and between 1978 and 1980 this body revised and amended the Constitution that had 
been presented to them by the “Comisión Ortúzar.”  Thus though it has frequently been argued 
that the Pinochet regime was a personalized one, like Franco’s (see Arriagada, 1986; Huneeus 












rules and procedures in a more collegial manner, and the negotiations that led to the drafting of 
the 1980 Constitution were no exception.95 
 
 During the constitutional debate the pervasive phantom of Allende, Marxism and the 
crisis of Unidad Popular government were present. In the name of order and peace, many 
questionable mechanisms were put into place in order to avoid another civil and political crisis.   
“Protected democracy” implied a fear of majority rule that was widely shared by members of 
both Commissions. And this fear found voice in the 1980 Constitution.96  
 
This brings us to Pedro Ibáñez and Carlos Cáceres, Hayek’s hosts on his 1977 visit. 
Recall that on July 7, 1978 Pedro Ibáñez wrote to Hayek about the impact of his first visit, noting 
that it became even more important “…now that there is an increasing debate on the new 
political institutions. Hence your ideas constantly emerge as frequent subjects of discussion. 
However the final outcome of the constitutional arguments is still far from clear.” Both Ibáñez 
and Cáceres were members of the Council of State.97 In March 1979 Pedro Ibáñez presented a 
Memorandum to the Council with a number of provisions for the new Constitution. In a later 
interview, Cáceres claimed that the Memorandum was inspired by Hayek’s Constitution of 
Liberty and Law, Legislation and Liberty, volume 3.98  Both Ibáñez and Cáceres thought that 
they were promoting Hayekian ideas. But they were not. The Ibáñez Memorandum proposed an 
autocratic government with limited suffrage, and an alternative mechanism for Presidential 
elections.99 The President of the Council, Jorge Alessandri, completely disagreed with it, and 
former President González Videla referred to the proposal as “totalitarian and fascist” 
(Arancibia, Brahm and Irarrazaval, 2008, vol. 1, p. 416). In the end only Ibáñez and Cáceres 
supported the Memorandum; on April 3, 1979 the Council voted 13 to 2 to reject further 
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On July 8, 1980 Jorge Alessandri presented the Council of State’s recommendations to 
Pinochet.100 The Junta, advised by Jaime Guzmán, revised it, and a month later published the 
final version in El Mercurio. Council President Alessandri immediately sent a letter of 
resignation to Pinochet in protest. Alessandri had wanted, among other things, elections to take 
place sooner, and to have a transitional Congress (Carrasco 1987, pp. 139-141).101 Finally on the 
symbolic date of September 11, after “a dubious plebiscite carried out amidst a state of 
emergency” (Barros 2002, p. 217), the 1980 Constitution was approved. During the run-up to the 
plebiscite the phrase “Constitution of Liberty” was used by promoters of the new Constitution.  
But the phrase was not an invocation of Hayek’s book of the same name. In the Chilean context, 
“Liberty” would mean for them “Not Marxist.” That was the signal that was being sent, not some 
reference to a book and an author few Chileans would have known about.  
 
The new Constitution left Pinochet in office as President for eight more years. Though it 
has many antidemocratic dispositions, it was built on the Constitutions of 1833 and especially, 
the 1925. However, it strengthened property rights, increased economic freedoms, and 
established the subsidiary role of the state.102 The 1980 Constitution has been criticized for a 
number of its provisions, among them the powerful role it gave to the armed forces, the 
exceptions it made that would allow constitutional limitations to be overridden, and its 
restrictions on civil and political liberties (Loveman 1993, p. 353). Its authoritarian origin has 
been also a source of criticism, but it must also be noted that it is hardly unique in that respect: it 
has been noted that “as of 2008 44 percent (79) of the world’s constitutions in force are 
categorized as democratic and the remaining 56 percent (99) categorized as authoritarian” 
(Elkins et al., 2014, pp. 145-6). As Collier and Sater 1996, p. 364, sum up: “[t]he tenor of the 
final version was markedly authoritarian. Among other things it provided for an extremely strong 
eight-year presidency (Pinochet wanted sixteen-year terms, but was dissuaded), a Congress with 
more limited powers than before (and with one-third of the Senate nominated, not elected), and 
various institutional mechanisms to entrench military influence over future governments. 
















decade.” 103 It must be added, however, that if the 1980 Constitution “appeared as a masterwork 
of authoritarian constitution making” (Barros 2002, p. 217), it also set new restrictions on 
Pinochet’s authority and, in the end, finally allowed for a plebiscite that would bring a return to 
democracy.104   
 
6.2 Hayek and the Viña del Mar Mont Pèlerin Society Meeting 
 
As noted earlier, a number of writers have claimed that Hayek chose Viña del Mar as the 
location for the 1981 Mont Pèlerin Society meeting.105 They point out that Hayek was both the 
founder and, by 1981, the honorary president of the organization, so presumably was in charge of 
selecting the sites for the meeting. Corey Robin notes further that there was correspondence 
dating as far back as 1978 from both Carlos Cáceres and Pedro Ibáñez to Hayek indicating their 
desire to hold the meeting in Chile, and that the decision was made at the 1980 Palo Alto 
meeting of the Society, which Robin claims that Hayek attended.  
 
There are numerous problems with these accounts.  Hayek was indeed the honorary 
president of the Mont Pèlerin Society, but this position did not carry with it any prerogative 
concerning siting of the meetings. That decision was made by the Executive Committee of the 
organization.  
 
It is true that both Carlos Cáceres and Pedro Ibáñez wrote to Hayek about wanting to 
have a meeting take place in Chile. Cáceres’s letter simply informed Hayek that at the upcoming 
























1980 General Meeting be held in Chile.106 Ibáñez’ letter to Hayek later that year was more 
detailed, and offered a number or reasons for why the meeting should be held in Chile. At the 
end he asked Hayek for his support:  
 
Economic as well as political developments in my country may be worth 
reviewing and analyzing on the spot.   
Needless to say, a group of top economists, business leaders and government 
officials would be only too glad to co-operate and welcome members of the Society. 
I can assure you that the Chilean group could arrange an interesting and 
appropriate programme, including of course entertainment of such a distinguished group. 
Although Chile might be considered by some people to be at the end of the world, 
I doubt whether Hong Kong is really any closer! 
If you share my view regarding the above, do you think I could count on your 
support and backing, when the time comes to set forth this suggestion to the Board of the 
Society?107 
 
It turns out that Ibáñez sent the same letter to a number of other high-ranking members of 
the Mont Pèlerin Society, including George Stigler (who was then the President) and Milton 
Friedman. There is no letter of reply from Hayek to either Cáceres or Ibáñez to be found in the 
Hayek archives or in the letters of Pedro Ibáñez. But both Stigler and Friedman did reply.108 The 
former said the matter would be “carefully considered by the Board.”  Friedman said the same, 
though he added that in his personal opinion it would be better to have a Regional meeting in 
Chile, rather than the General meeting.  
 
At the 1978 Hong Kong General meeting (which Hayek attended) it was decided that the 
next General meeting would take place in 1980 at the Hoover Institution, at Stanford University 
in Palo Alto, California.  It was only at the 1980 meeting in Palo Alto that it was decided that the 
next Regional meeting would be held at Viña del Mar, Chile, in either September or November, 
1981. Contrary to the Robins account, though Hayek had planned to attend the Palo Alto 
meeting, he had to cancel out due to health problems.109 Furthermore, there is no evidence that 
he had any influence from afar. Indeed, in a letter to Hayek in October, 1980, Carlos Cáceres felt 














hope that Hayek could come to it, even if it meant postponing Hayek’s planned visit in April 
1981.110 Why would Cáceres have informed him of this if Hayek had been in on the planning?   
 
So if it was not a matter of Hayek selecting Viña del Mar, how was it decided that the 
1981 meeting would be in Chile? The simplest answer is that the leadership recognized that a 
number of South American members wanted to host a meeting, and further that by 1980, Manuel 
Ayau was President of the Mont Pèlerin Society. Carlos Cáceres attended the 1980 meeting as a 
guest and Pedro Ibáñez participated as a member.111 Thus there was plenty of support on the 
ground in Palo Alto for selecting Chile as the site for the next Regional Meeting 
 
A final note: the leadership of the Mont Pèlerin Society, in particular Milton Friedman, 
wanted either to make it clear that the Society did not support the Pinochet regime, or 
alternatively, to avoid any pretext for demonstrations when the Society’s meetings were held at 
Stanford. In the files of Pedro Ibáñez’s correspondence there is a letter from Manuel Ayau to 
Ibáñez dated April 28, 1980 in which Ayau notes a “problem” regarding the upcoming meeting 
in Palo Alto. In the letter he explains to Ibáñez that though Sergio de Castro had been invited to 
participate as a guest, the organizing Committee had decided to “disinvite” him. Although 
invitations would be still be sent to other people whom Ibáñez had recommended, including 
Jorge Cauas, Pablo Barahona and Carlos Cáceres,  Ayau explained to Ibáñez that he “had agreed 
with Milton Friedman not to invite people currently in government positions”, which would 
exclude Sergio de Castro, who was Finance Minister by then.     
 
7. The April 1981 Visit 
 
 The circumstances of Hayek’s second trip to Chile were quite different from the first 
visit. On March 26, 1980 Jorge Cauas, President of the Banco de Santiago, wrote to Hayek that 
“the economy has continued improving its operation increasingly relying in free markets. We are 
nevertheless aware of the need to complement this economic picture with analysis on those 
aspects which form, in your words, the basis of the political order in a free society.” As such, he 
and a group of “private businessmen” were forming a Center dedicated to the study of “political 
philosophy, political economy and public affairs.” Given his contributions in such works as The 
Constitution of Liberty and Law, Legislation and Liberty it was only natural that they would seek 
his support and advice (“as our intellectual leader”) with this initiative.112 Cauas visited Hayek in 
Freiburg in late May. In an interview Cauas recalled that they met at Hayek’s house there and 










Honorary President and Council Member of the newly formed Centro de Estudios Públicos 
(CEP, or Center for Policy Studies). According to Cauas, Hayek understood the importance of 
CEP for the future of Chile, accepted the invitation to become its Honorary President, and said 
that he would seriously consider another visit to Chile.113 
 
 On his return to Chile Cauas wrote to thank Hayek for the meeting and let him know who 
else was to serve on the Council of CEP. In addition to the Chilean members, offers had been 
extended to Karl Brunner (who had accepted), Armen Alchian (who was deliberating), as well as 
to Milton Friedman, Ernst-Joaquim Mestmäcker, Arthur Seldon and Theodore W. Schultz.114 
Cauas wanted to have the first full meeting of the Council sometime in 1981, so he asked when 
Hayek might next be coming to Latin America so that the meeting could be planned around his 
schedule. He also attached the bylaws of CEP, a document that began with a mission statement: 
 
The purpose of the Center is the diagnosis and analysis of philosophical, political, social, 
economic and public affairs problems with the objective of fostering the understanding of 
the determinants which ensure the attaining and preservation of a free society.  
 
As a Center of thought sustained on the moral bases of the western world, the values that 
underlie its action are those which allow the existence of the widest personal freedom in a 
society living in peace and harmony. The set of values which orders and centers its 
actions is, therefore, that in which priority is given to the ideals of liberty.  
 
The center shall implement its objectives through research studies, publications, seminars 
























Later in the summer Hernán Cortés wrote to Hayek to inform him about the first Ordinary 
meeting of CEP (one without foreign members present), and to suggest that the first Plenary 
meeting take place in April 1981. Cortés finished his letter to Hayek saying that he might attend 
the September 1980 Mont Pèlerin Meeting at the Hoover Institution in Palo Alto, and if he did, 
he “would like very much to have a talk with you.” From this we deduce that though he had 
agreed to be Honorary President of CEP, Hayek had not yet confirmed his willingness to visit 
Chile again.  
 
 On October 10, 1980 Carlos Cáceres wrote Hayek a lengthy letter in support of Cauas 
and CEP, apparently in response to correspondence from Hayek, who had questions he wanted 
answered before committing to come the next April.115 Cáceres told him that Cauas had served 
as the President of the Central Bank during the Frei Montalva Government, as Finance Minister 
under Pinochet from 1975-1977, and as the Chilean Ambassador to the US in 1977-78. He 
praised Cauas for establishing a “free economic system” in a difficult context, adding that “a lot 
of courage as well as clear ideas and goals were required to make such decisions.” He also 
mentioned that Cauas was a member of the Council of the Adolfo Ibáñez Foundation, 
underlining “his important contributions to our educational activities.” Cáceres went on to note 
that since he returned to Chile after his stint as Ambassador, Cauas had been devoted to “the 
development of an intellectual group which can support the basic ideas of a free social system.” 
He had assembled a brilliant group of Council members, whom Cáceres identified by name and 
profession. Cáceres concluded with a strong endorsement of Cauas and CEP and asked Hayek 
for his support, since that would “bring high prestige to the Institute” and “create a pledge among 
its members in the constant achievement of the ideas that you have always sponsored.”116 
 
Cáceres also noted that the next Regional Meeting of the MPS would be held in Viña del 
Mar in September or November, 1981, adding that “All of us will be very pleased if you could 
participate in that meeting. Accordingly, I would like to ask you to postpone your trip to Chile 
until the date of the meeting, that I will confirm you as soon as possible.” By supporting Cauas 
and CEP, Carlos Cáceres was probably aware that it would be less likely that Hayek would 

















Finally, Hayek made a decision. On October 20, 1980, Hayek wrote to all those involved 
with his visit to South America (Cauas, Cortés, and Cáceres in Chile, Maksoud in Brazil, and 
Benegas Lynch in Argentina) informing them that he would be able to visit South America with 
his wife “about mid-April to mid-May.” He noted that he would visit Chile first, then asked his 
Argentinian and Brazilian hosts to arrange the rest of his visit to their countries. He concluded 
that, “I am afraid I have to plead that the amount of work I can do is now somewhat limited, but I 
shall of course be prepared to speak on two or three occasions during my stay in each 
country.”118 
 
 Accompanied by his wife, Hayek arrived in Santiago on Wednesday April 15. Compared 
to his first trip, the list of events on his printed schedule was rather light. April 19 was Easter 
Sunday, so virtually nothing was planned until Monday April 20, when the meeting of the CEP 
Council took place. On Tuesday a visit to Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile was planned. 
That day, on his own initiative and request, Hayek also had a one hour meeting with former 
President Frei Montalva.119 Over the next two days a conference titled “Foundations for a Free 
Society System” (“Fundamentos de un Sistema Social Libre”) and organized by CEP took place. 
Held at the Sheraton Hotel in Santiago, the academic event received wide coverage in the press. 
The international members of CEP’s Council presented their work.120 On Friday April 24 Hayek 
had a meeting with former President Jorge Alessandri. After that conversation, he declared that 




























planning meeting for the upcoming Mont Pèlerin Society regional meeting. He also gave a 
lecture to graduate students at the Valparaíso Business School. On Saturday they lunched at 
Pedro Ibáñez’s farm in Colunquén, as Hayek had done on his 1977 visit. He spent Sunday with 
his wife at Viña del Mar and in the evening attended the opening events of a meeting, organized 
by Miguel Kast, titled an International Conference on Experiences of Political Economics 
(“Conferencia Internacional sobre Experiencias de Política Económica”). The conference 
proper, held at the Hotel Miramar in Viña del Mar, began on Monday, and Hayek gave a lecture 
entitled “The Role of International Institutions” in the first morning session.122 On Tuesday, 
April 28 he gave another lecture at the Business School of Valparaíso, then flew to Argentina. 
 
The Council meeting of CEP that took place on Monday April 20 revealed certain 
tensions among the board members regarding the direction that the new organization should take. 
In their initial invitations to Hayek the Chilean principals emphasized the importance of political 
philosophy and constitutional questions for CEP, and the statement of principles for the 
organization stated it was to concentrate on political, philosophical, social, and economic issues. 
This was doubtless because political and constitutional issues were much on their minds, given 
that a new constitution had only recently been ratified. The minutes from the meeting show that 
nonetheless this broad mandate did not sit well with certain of the economists, most of whom 
were aligned with the approach of the Chicago School. Apparently their opinions were 
persuasive:  
 
The discussion was centered on the suggestions of Council members Schultz and Alchian 
to concentrate the Centro’s efforts in economic areas and de-emphasize the areas of 
philosophy and political theory. There was agreement to dedicate the Centro’s efforts 
towards economic matters and maintain Estudios Públicos [CEP’s journal] for multi-
disciplinary purposes.  
 
When attention turned to possible themes for future seminars at CEP, the division came up again: 
 
Professor Mestmäcker emphasized themes about the Constitution and Professors Alchian 















capital, the distribution of income, in addition to economic problems of different 
institutions; local government and legislation about publicly held corporations. The 
studies about the theories of industrial organization done at UCLA will be especially 
important for this last. 
 
The differences so clearly reflected in the minutes had in fact been somewhat anticipated during 
Hayek’s first visit in 1977. In an editorial in El Mercurio published on November 22, 1977, just 
two days after Hayek had left, Hayek’s differences with the Chicago School and Friedman were 
emphasized. The editorial concluded that “the government policies do not belong to the School 
of Chicago, nor to any other in particular.” In a separate interview that took place on that trip, 
Hayek was asked about his opinion of the University of Chicago, monetarism and Milton 
Friedman. It is worth repeating Hayek’s answer: “Milton Friedman is an old friend of mine. I 
agree with him in general, but I disagree on two points. Friedman is a positivist and he gives too 
much importance to statistical data. This macroeconomic interpretation is useless. Only 
microeconomics has value for the economy. And regarding his quantitative theory of money, it is 
excellent, but very simple. Perhaps too simple.”123 In addition to the differences that Hayek 
pointed out in the interview, there is also a difference between the purely economic focus of 
Chicago and Hayek’s insistence that the broader political and juridical institutional framework 
needs careful attention. This was a division that had long been evident in the Mont Pèlerin 
Society meetings, one that played out again in Chile, becoming more explicit in 1981.124 
 
As with the 1977 visit, afterwards further newspaper controversies at home would follow. 
On December 30, 1981 the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung published a political cartoon by Fritz 
Behrendt (1925-2008) depicting Pinochet and Jaruzelski, the Polish dictator, hailing each other 
as they rode horse-back style on exhausted people of their respective countries (Hallo, 
Kollege).125 Hayek’s critical letter to the editor was published on January 6, 1982.  
 
I cannot help but protest in the strongest possible terms against the cartoon on page 3 of 
your publication of the 30th of December equating the present governments of Poland 
and Chile. It can only be explained by complete ignorance of the facts or by the 
systematically promoted socialist calumnies of the present situation in Chile, which I had 
not expected the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung to fall for.  I believe that all the 
participants in the Mont Pèlerin Society conference held a few weeks ago in Chile would 











of the facts.  Any Pole lucky enough to escape to Chile could consider himself 
fortunate.126 
 
Hayek sent copies of the cartoon and of his letter to Pedro Ibáñez, Miguel Kast, Carlos 
Cáceres and Hernán Cortés. Cáceres wrote back, “I want to thank your courageous position to 
defend the Chilean reality. I agree with you about the happiness of many Polish having the 
possibility of living in our country.”127 For his part, Pedro Ibáñez wrote, “I am very grateful to 
you for your indignant protest about the caricature against Chile.”128 
 
It is perhaps appropriate here to mention Margaret Thatcher’s letter around the same time 
to Hayek, in which she calls the progression from Allende to the current day “a striking example 
of economic reform from which we can learn many lessons.” But she goes on to say that she 
assumes that Hayek would agree that “in Britain with our democratic institutions and the need 
for a high degree of consent, some of the measures adopted in Chile are quite unacceptable.” She 
acknowledges that the democratic process moves slowly, but expresses her confidence that “we 
shall achieve our reforms in our own way and in our own time” and that the reforms will 
endure.129 
  
Both Charlotte Cubitt (2006, p. 19) and Farrant, McPhail and Berger (2012, p. 535, note 
35) report that Thatcher’s admonition was in response to a letter that Hayek had sent to her, with 
Cubitt stating that the letter was to protest the cartoon in FAZ. And indeed Thatcher thanks 
Hayek for a letter of February 5. There is no copy of any letter, however, in either the Hayek or 
Thatcher archives. It should also be noted that Thatcher begins her letter to Hayek saying how 
nice it was to see him the week before at a dinner that Walter Solomon had organized, and to 
hear Hayek’s views “on the great issues of our times.”  This suggests that Thatcher’s letter may 
also have been in response to something that was said in conversation at the dinner. Of course, 
we have no evidence of what may have been said, either in a letter or at the dinner, but the 
conjecture offered by Farrant, et. al.,“that Hayek was urging Thatcher to outlaw strikes or to 














Hayek had repeatedly complained about and recommended, not just to Thatcher, but in 
pamphlets and in letters to the press, over a period of time.130  
 
 
8. The 1981 El Mercurio Interviews 
 
During the 1981 trip, Hayek sat for two interviews that were published on successive 
Sundays in El Mercurio. The first one took place at Hayek’s university in Freiburg prior to his 
trip to Chile and was published in El Mercurio on April 12, a few days before he arrived. The 
interviewer was Renée Sallas, an Argentinian journalist. The second interview took place in 
Chile. The interviewer was Lucía Santa Cruz, a well-regarded Chilean historian who had studied 
at Oxford while her father was the Chilean Ambassador to the U.K. and who was a frequent and 
influential contributor to public debate. Both interviews took place in English and were 
subsequently translated into Spanish. At some point the Spanish interviews were retranslated 
back into English and made available on the internet.131 Passages from the interviews are often 
quoted to infer Hayek’s views on democracy and dictatorship. We will show below that these 
passages were only a small part of what was covered in the interviews, and that many of the 
views that Hayek expressed reflect positions that he had held for many years.  
 
 
8.1. Interview 1 (El Mercurio, Sunday, April 12, 1981) 
  
Much of the interview deals with current world events such as the recent election and 
inauguration of Ronald Reagan. Hayek looked forward to the new administration, saying that the 
US had been on a bad path at least since FDR, and that the situation had gotten even worse in the 
last twenty years or so. The election of Reagan, and before him Mrs. Thatcher’s accession to the 
post of Prime Minister, gave Hayek some hope for the future, because both of them sought to 
limit the power of government and return to the principles of classical liberalism. He offered his 
opinions of various leaders and the issues that they faced. Reagan had good advisors in his view, 

















inflation under control were positions that Hayek shared. Hayek thought Reagan would have an 
easier time of it than Thatcher, who would have to face the strength and socialist leanings of the 
trade unions in England. He found it hard to take Reagan’s predecessor President Carter 
seriously, characterizing him as well-intentioned, naïve, and weak. Regarding the Iranian hostage 
crisis, Hayek viewed it as a fundamental violation of international law.132 He thought that Carter 
should have responded immediately with an ultimatum stating that unless they were released 
Tehran would be bombarded: no government should depart from general principles when dealing 
with terrorists.  
 
In the course of commenting on current events Hayek articulated a number of his 
standard positions. Thus he held that though the government should and must provide certain 
services, it should never have a monopoly on their provision.133 Its laws should be general and 
universally applicable, so as to not intervene arbitrarily.134 A system of free markets was, in his 
view, the best way to ensure that the now large world population could be fed.135 Calls for 
“social justice” (Hayek requested that, “…when you write these two words, place them in 
quotation marks, because for me they are lacking in all meaning…”) that typically involve 
intervening in markets would not end poverty, only bestow privileges on specific interests.136 
Regarding macroeconomic issues, “My theory…is that excessive public sector expansion, deficit 
spending by government, and generous money creation by the central bank are the main causes 
of economic problems in any country.” All of this would be familiar territory to any student of 



























The parts of the interview that dealt with dictatorships have gained the most attention. 
Here is what was said: 
 
Sallas: What is your opinion of dictatorships? 
 
Hayek: Well, I would say that, as long-term institution I am totally against dictatorships. 
But a dictatorship may be a necessary system during a transitional period. Sometimes it is 
necessary for a country to have, for a time, some form of dictatorial power. As you will 
understand, it is possible for a dictator to govern in a liberal way. And it is also possible 
for a democracy to govern with a total lack of liberalism. I personally prefer a liberal 
dictator to a democratic government lacking liberalism. My particular impression is – and 
this is valid for South America – that in Chile, for example, there will be a transition from 
a dictatorial government to a liberal government. And during this transition it may be 
necessary to maintain certain dictatorial powers, not as something permanent, but as a 
temporary transitional arrangement.  
 
Sallas: Apart from Chile, could you mention other cases of transitional dictatorial 
governments? 
 
Hayek: Well, in England Cromwell played a transitional role between absolute royal 
power and the limited powers of the constitutional monarchies. In Portugal, the dictator 
Oliveira Salazar attempted the right path in that sense, but failed. He tried, but did not 
succeed. Then after the war, Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhardt in the beginning had 
almost dictatorial powers, and they used it to establish a free government in the shortest 
possible time. The situation required the presence of two very strong men to achieve this 
task. And the two of them accomplished very well this stage towards the establishment of 
a democratic government. If you allow me, I would like to make a brief comment in this 
sense about Argentina. 
 
Sallas: Of course. 
 
Hayek: I felt very disenchanted right from my first visit there, shortly after Peron’s fall.137 
At that time I talked with many officers from the Military Forces. And they were very 
intelligent people. Politically, brilliant. I would say, among the most brilliant politicians 
in your country. I felt it was a pity that they did not make better use of that intelligence. I 
would have hoped from them the establishment of the basis, the foundations, for the 








not know why they did fail, but my impression is that they had the political capacity and 
the intelligence to do it.  
 
Sallas: Which means that, for the transitional periods, you would propose stronger, 
dictatorial governments… 
 
Hayek: When a government is broken, and there are no recognized rules, it is necessary 
to create rules to say what can be done and what cannot be done. In such circumstances it 
is practically inevitable for someone to have almost absolute powers. Absolute powers 
that they should precisely use to avoid and limit any absolute power in the future. It may 
seem a contradiction that precisely I say this, as I plead for limiting government’s powers 
in people’s lives and maintain that many of our problems are born, just out of the excess 
of government. But, however, when I refer to this dictatorial power, I am only talking for 
a transitional period. As a means for establishing a stable democracy and liberty, free of 
impurities. Only in this way I can justify, advise it. 
 
 What to make of these exchanges?  Hayek took pains to make clear that for him, 
dictatorship can only be justified as a temporary response to a breakdown in society, and that the 
goal should be return to a stable democracy.  He offers examples of countries in which, after the 
transitional period was over, stable democratic institutions were re-established (England in the 
17th century; post-war West Germany) and some examples of countries that did not have such 
favorable outcomes (Portugal under Salazar, and, pointedly, Argentina after Perón). He appears 
to have been hopeful about Chile’s prospects.  
 
The notion that the dictatorial government should use its power to place limits on 
government power in the future is fully compatible with his general view that the key problem of 
a liberal democratic order is solved by giving the government a monopoly on the use of force, 
and then placing strict limits of its use of coercive powers by means of constitutional and other 
restrictions – e.g., separation of powers, a bicameral legislature, a bill of rights, an independent 
judiciary, and other safeguards.   
 
Certainly one of the more controversial opinions that Hayek expressed is that he 
personally would favor a liberal dictatorship over an illiberal or unlimited democracy. This gets 
at a distinction that he drew earlier in the interview between a constitutionally limited democracy 
(his preferred system) and the sort of unlimited democracy that he disparaged. This distinction 
loomed large in what was then his most recently completed book, Law, Legislation and Liberty. 
But the distinction between liberalism and democracy is one that he had emphasized for at least 
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twenty years.138 Hayek here was merely repeating what he had written on many occasions 
before.  
  
6.2. Interview 2 (El Mercurio, Sunday, April 19, 1981) 
 
The published second interview took place in Chile and was conducted by Lucia Santa 
Cruz. In the initial part of their conversation Hayek said that he had accepted the Presidency of 
CEP because he was interested in the Chilean case, adding that “From the little I have seen, I 
believe it is not an exaggeration to talk about the Chilean miracle. The progress during these 
years is enormous.” The phrase “Chilean miracle” would quickly become a catchphrase in 
discussions of Chile’s economic turnaround.   
 
In the beginning of this interview Hayek repeated some standard Hayekian themes from 
his 1960 book The Constitution of Liberty, and indeed, ideas that he had mentioned in his 
interview with Sallas the week before. Thus he defined liberty in terms of individual freedom 
and absence of coercion; he stated that freedom under the law means living under a system of 
known and general rules; he noted that equality before the law, that is, equal enforcement of the 
law, prohibits further attempts to make otherwise unequal people equal; he allowed that 
government has many functions but that government monopolies are to be avoided; and he 
asserted that only a free market would allow us to feed the world’s population. Harking back to 
ideas he had expressed as long ago as The Road to Serfdom, he stated that it is fine for the 
government to provide a safety net.139 He also touched on how the knowledge problem makes 
extensive planning by the state infeasible, a theme that dates to his 1945 article “The Use of 
Knowledge in Society” and to his earlier critiques of socialist planning.140 
 
In the next section, Hayek discussed the relationship between economic and political 




















Hayek: Economic freedom cannot be separated from other freedoms. Liberty is about 
experiencing, and you can only experience if you can use all the means available. The 
distinction between economic freedom and intellectual or cultural freedom is artificial. 
There is no system that, deprived of economic freedom, has been able to guarantee 
intellectual freedom.  
 
He then offered the standard Hayekian position (one controversial among his more libertarian 
followers) that as long as laws are equally applied to everyone by government, they are not 
coercive.141  He allows that deviations from the generality norm may sometimes have to occur, 
but expressed his hope that this would be temporary: “some restrictions might be necessary in a 
period of transition, but this would not be desirable as a permanent state.” Hayek then repeated 
his view of the relationship between liberty and democracy, and of the instrumental value of the 
latter:  
 
Hayek: Liberty requires a certain degree of democracy but it is not compatible with 
unlimited democracy, or better said, with the existence of a representative legislative 
assembly with all-embracing powers. However, for liberty it is indispensable that 
individuals can put to an end a government that the majority rejects. This is of great 
value. Democracy has a task that I call of “hygiene,” ensuring that political processes are 
conducted in a healthy way.  It is not an end in itself. It is a procedural rule that has the 
objective of serving freedom. But in no way has it the same standing as liberty. The latter 
requires democracy, but I would rather prefer to sacrifice temporarily, I repeat, 
temporarily, democracy rather than doing without liberty, even if it were temporarily. 
 
Hayek then briefly described his solution for the problem of democracy, namely, the “model 
constitution” that he had presented in the third volume of Law, Legislation and Liberty.142 Under 
this plan, the government would  
 
…consist of two Chambers with two different purposes. On the one hand, a true 
legislative body with limited powers to establish general rules, and another Chamber that 
would direct the government itself. Government would be, of course, limited by the 
general rules that the first Chamber would establish. 
 











Hayek: By a system of elections, but different for each case. For the one in charge of 
government tasks, representation would be based on the different sectorial interests. In 
the legislative, instead, more experts, wise and experienced men, who know their subject, 
would be required. They would also be elected, but not on the political parties ground, as 
would be the case for the legislative body, and for a longer term. They could not be re-
elected to avoid political pressures. Needless to say the executive Chamber would be 
subject to the general laws of the country. 
 
The next question about natural law will seem strange to readers unfamiliar with Chilean 
politics, but it had political implications: the question was aimed at countering the gremialistas. 
Hayek’s response, that laws and norms evolve through a process of competitive selection, is fully 
consistent with Hayek’s writings in Law, Legislation and Liberty about “grown law.”143 
 
Lucia Santa Cruz: Do you believe in natural law and that liberty and property, for 
example, are prior to the State? 
 
Hayek: No, in the traditional sense, but yes in a certain sense. I believe that the best 
norms and laws have been selected by an evolutionary process. They have not been 
constructed intellectually. Like other products of evolution, one can legitimately say that 
there is more wisdom in tradition than in deliberate constructions. This does not mean 
that all traditions are good. Tradition needs to demonstrate its goodness. 
 
This can be measured by the success of the institutions it has produced, and in general it 
can be affirmed that the law and liberty tradition has proved been more successful than 
other traditions. 
 
Santa Cruz then asked a question about dictatorships that has garnered much attention. 
 
Lucia Santa Cruz: On other opportunities you have referred to the apparent paradox that a 
dictatorial government may be more liberal than a totalitarian democracy. However, it is 
also true that dictatorships have other characteristics which clash with liberty. Even when 
it is conceived in the negative way you do… 
 
Hayek: Evidently, there are major dangers with dictatorships. But a dictatorship can limit 
itself and a dictatorship that deliberately sets limits on itself can be more liberal in its 
policies than a democratic assembly without limits. I have to admit that probably this 






certain hope, because it will always depend on the good will of an individual and there 
are very few individuals that can be trusted. But, despite this, if it is the only opportunity 
that exists at a moment, it may be the best solution. Only if the dictatorial government is 
visibly directing towards a limited democracy.144 
 
If one compares this response with the one he had given Sallas the week before, the similarities 
are evident: dictatorship is not a first best solution, but may be the only hope in certain 
circumstances – the hope being that it will deliberately limit itself.145  
 
Santa Cruz then took up questions of the role of moral values in society and politics. 
Hayek reiterated the idea that morals are selected through an evolutionary process, and then 
noted the importance of specific liberal values (like the protection of private property) for 
maintaining the world’s population. This is followed by a discussion of the relationship between 
the Catholic Church and liberalism. Hayek disagreed with the Church’s “extremely doctrinaire 
position on birth control,” and when asked about the ecclesiastical pronouncements against 
capitalism, he said, “I don’t like the word capitalism either, and I would be happy to change it.” 
In this section, like the one where natural law was discussed, Lucia Santa Cruz again appears to 
have been enlisting Hayek against the gremialistas, the influential conservative Catholic political 
movement led by Jaime Guzmán, the architect of the Chilean constitution. As noted earlier, his 
political party, UDI, was a strong influence at the end and after the Pinochet regime. It would 
appear that Santa Cruz sought to show that at least one prominent intellectual (Hayek) disagreed 
with at least some of their views. 
 
She next asked whether there is a tension between liberty and equality. Hayek offered his 
standard response that the most important form of equality is equality before the law, and that 
equality in opportunity is very difficult to attain in a world in which people are so different from 
one another.  He also dismissed the idea that the state is a good guardian of culture. The 
interviewer then turned to the fraught subject of neo-liberalism, which then segues into a 
discussion of the influence of the Chicago Boys. The exchange is fascinating: 
 
Lucia Santa Cruz: Now, liberalism traditionally has been a mentality more than a rigidly 
structured doctrine, a pragmatic and empirical focus, an application of the principle of 
“trial and error.” There are people who believe that neo-liberalism is essentially different 
in this respect, because it offers a very solid structure which could be classified as a very 
coherent, global ideology. How can this be compatible, for example, with the idea of the 
great liberal Karl Popper that politics, like any scientific hypothesis, is only a conjectural 









Hayek: Popper and I are in agreement in almost every respect. The problem is that we are 
not neo-liberals. Those who define themselves in this way are not liberal, they are 
socialist. We are liberals who are seeking to renovate, but we adhere to the old tradition, 
that we can improve, but cannot change what is fundamental. The opposite is to fall into 
rationalist constructivism, in the idea that it is possible to build a social structure 
intellectually conceived by men and imposed according to a plan without any 
consideration of the cultural evolutionary processes. 
 
Lucia Santa Cruz: Don’t you believe that in the Chilean case, for example, where an 
attempt to apply a very coherent model in all spheres of national life, there are certain 
features of what you call constructivism? 
 
Hayek: I don’t know enough to give you an opinion. I know that the economists are solid. 
 
Lucia Santa Cruz: But the model embraces more than only the economy… 
 
Hayek: It is possible that this is due to the enormous influence that positivism and 
utilitarianism have had in Latin America. Bentham and Comte have been major 
intellectual figures and liberalism on this continent has always been constructivist. Milton 
Friedman, for example, is a great economist with whom I agree on almost every point, 
but disagree not only on the mechanical use of money supply. I am too an economist, but 
I like to think that I am something more than that. I always say that an economist who is 
only an economist, cannot even be a good economist. Well, Friedman grew up in the 
tradition of the Bureau of Economic Research under Mitchell’s influence. He maintains 
that since we have created institutions, we can change them as we want. This is an 
intellectual mistake. It is an error. It is false. In this sense, Milton is more constructivist 
than I am. 
 
This last exchange places front and center the differences and the tensions between Hayek’s 
views and those of Friedman and the Chicago Boys. Finally, given recent discussions about neo-
liberalism among historians of economics, it is worth noting that Hayek here rather dramatically 
disavows the label.  
 
 
9. Why Didn’t Hayek Condemn Pinochet’s Human Rights Abuses? 
 
We turn at last to the uncomfortable question of why Hayek chose to remain silent about the 
human rights abuses that took place under the junta, a question about which we can only offer 




 Some of it initially probably had to do with personal loyalties. Hayek had been urged to 
go to Chile by Manuel Ayau, a friend from the Mont Pèlerin Society. One of his early hosts, 
Pedro Ibáñez, had been a member of the Mont Pèlerin Society since 1970. He was also an 
important political figure in Chile (senator for two periods) and a supporter of the regime. Hayek 
considered Ayau as a friend and he was in Chile as an invited guest.  As such, it is unsurprising 
that he kept silent about certain issues involving their country while he was there. 
 
 We have shown that Hayek, as he himself admitted and indeed revealed in his responses 
to certain interview questions, did not know that much about conditions in Chile prior to his first 
arrival there in 1977. As the week progressed, however, it became increasingly evident to him 
that the Chilean economy had greatly improved over the past two years, and was in much better 
shape than he had expected.  Any expectations that he had formed prior to his visit had doubtless 
been based upon news reports in the international press.  
 
 Hayek’s reaction is evident; before he had even gotten back to Freiburg, he shot off his 
opinion piece condemning press coverage of places like Chile and South Africa to FAZ. Their 
refusal to publish even an abbreviated version as a letter to the editor was doubtless taken by 
Hayek as confirming evidence for his dismal views of the press. It is possible that his distrust of 
the veracity of western reporting may have extended to their accounts of human rights abuses.  
 
 In the background to all of this, of course, was the fact that the 1970s was an 
ideologically fraught time. The cold war was an ongoing reality. Protests in the street over the 
Viet Nam War, over racism, over the inequities of capitalism, and indeed, over human rights 
violations, were perennial fixtures in the news. Stagflation and the inability of policy-makers to 
do anything about it (indeed, the ‘stop-go policy’ that was followed in the US and UK arguably 
made it worse) led to calls for radical reforms in economic policy: wage and price controls, 
incomes policies, and the like. And these were being promoted by some of the same Nobel Prize 
winners who had chastised the Nobel Committee for selecting the likes of Friedman and Hayek.  
 
When Hayek visited Chile again in 1981, there had been three more years of strong 
economic growth and a new constitution was in place that called for a referendum in 1988 that 
could lead to elections in 1989. The economic record in Chile was in marked contrast to what 
had been going on in much of the west, and which had resulted in the elections of Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher that Hayek discussed in his second interview. Hayek reported to 
his secretary Charlotte Cubitt that on the second trip he had walked around on his own to see if 
he had been deluded, and told her that “it was the sight of so many sturdy and healthy children 






confirmed what he had already thought about economic conditions in the country. But in 
addition, he had been invited by CEP, an organization that was itself concerned with figuring out 
how to find a road back to a constitutional democracy.  
 
Indeed, it is probable that Hayek hoped to have an impact on the course of political 
events in not just Chile, but in other countries that had imposed dictatorships to forestall 
communist takeovers. He recognized that the leaders in such countries blamed their problems on 
democracy. When he would meet with such people, he would agree that unlimited democracy 
was indeed a danger. But he also held out an alternative for how to make democracy work – to 
do so, one must limit it. The Constitution of Liberty was a philosophical, theoretical and 
historical treatment of the topic. Hayek’s “model constitution” was meant to provide a somewhat 
more concrete proposal for how to put limitations on the democratic process.147 Hayek always 
insisted that he was a supporter of democracy, but that democracy had to be limited.148 We 
finally conclude with an evident fact of history: Chile did in fact make a transition back to 
democracy. We doubt that Hayek had anything to do with this, and to be sure, Pinochet did not 
go willingly into the dark night. But in the end, democracy was restored.  
 
 
10. Conclusions  
 
1. During the first trip Hayek met with elite members of the Chilean society who were 
gracious hosts and were active supporters of the military regime. He gradually 
warmed to what he saw and came away with the feeling that there were some 
dramatic economic improvements, and that conditions in Chile and other places had 
been misrepresented in the press. He felt this strongly enough to have written to the 
FAZ while still on his trip.  
2. We have presented evidence that Hayek’s ideas were little known in Chile in the 
1970s. As such, it is very unlikely that they played a role in the creation of the 1980 
Chilean Constitution.  It also does not seem that those who invoked his name to 
















3. We have shown that the available evidence suggests that Hayek did not participate in 
the selection of Viña del Mar as the site for the 1981 Regional Meeting of the Mont 
Pèlerin Society.  
4. Hayek’s second trip to Chile was quite different from the first in terms of his hosts. 
Both Jorge Cauas and Hernán Cortés Douglas, President and Executive Director of 
CEP, wanted to learn more about his political and social philosophy and to gain some 
insights about how to make the transition back to a constitutional democracy in Chile. 
Other members of CEP, however, wanted to retain the Chicago Boys’ emphasis on 
economic policy. The tension came up in some early interviews when Hayek 
commented about Friedman, and was evident in the April 1981 meeting of the 
Council of CEP and in his interview with Lucia Santa Cruz.  
5. The interviews in El Mercurio have not been well represented. Most of what was said 
was not about Pinochet directly, and in those parts that could be taken as being 
relevant to Chile, Hayek was repeating views that he had expressed many times 
before. Furthermore, some interesting questions and responses were missed: e.g., 
Lucia Santa Cruz’s attempt to get him to criticize natural law doctrine and the 
Catholic Church, which would have been read in Chile as a criticism of Jaime 
Guzmán and gremialismo, and his criticisms of Friedman’s methodological approach.  
6. We gave a number of possible reasons for why Hayek failed to speak out about 
human rights abuses. Given the string of countries that he visited on his trips (others 
of which also had authoritarian governments in place with their own human right 
records), and his visits to confer with former Chilean presidents on his second visit, it 
may be that he hoped autocratic regimes that practiced what he considered to be 
sensible economic policies would find a way back to liberal democracy. 
Constitutional constraints on unlimited democracy might provide the means to do so. 
Chile had adopted a constitution in 1981 that promised to hold a referendum that 
would allow a return to democratic elections in 1988. This was just the sort of result 
for which Hayek hoped. And Chile’s success, after following economic liberalization, 
set a good example. As Puryear 1994, pp. ix-x notes, since 1980 “fifteen military 
regimes have yielded power to elected civilian governments, and today Cuba is the 
lone remaining Latin American dictatorship.”  
7. Finally, whatever Hayek’s hopes may have been, his ideas had either no, or if any, 
only minor, influence on the course of Chilean politics before the 1980 Constitution.  
His thought has become much better understood there in recent years, due largely to 
the efforts of CEP that began in the early 1980s. But they were not well known at the 
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